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Within the bounds of their possibilities, individuals generally try to eliminate the risks resulting
from their social and economic activities as much as possible. In this regard, a common way
of doing so is by means of risk sharing and/or insurance. Firms, for instance, might prefer
to cooperate in joint ventures when investing in risky projects, while investors perpetrate risk
sharing by investing their capital in a diversified portfolio of financial assets.
In insurance, an insurance company contracts to bear (part of) an individual’s risk in
exchange for a fixed payment, the insurance premium. For actuarial scientists, this insurance
premium has been and still is a much examined research topic. The main question they address
is, what is a reasonable premium for the risk that is insured, for the insurance premium should
be acceptable with respect to the opposite interests of both the insurer and the insured.
Classical actuarial theory mainly considers this problem from the insurer’s point of view.
In determining a reasonable insurance premium, it distinguishes between risk arising from the
‘life’ sector and risk arising from the ‘non life’ sector. For the first, there is a profusion of
statistical data on the expected remaining life available, which makes the calculation of an
appropriate premium relatively easy. For the latter, however, things are a bit more complicated.
In ‘non life’ insurance the risk is not always easy to capture in a statistical framework. Therefore,
several premium calculation principles have been developed to serve this purpose, see for
instance Goovaerts, De Vylder and Haezendonck (1984).
These calculation principles, however, only take into account a part of the insurer’s side
of the deal. More precisely, they consider whether the premium is high enough to cover the
risk. Competition arising from the presence of other insurers on the one hand, and the interests
of the insured, on the other hand, are mostly ignored. It is, of course, better to consider
all these aspects in an insurance deal, since the premium should not only be high enough to
compensate the insurer for bearing the individual’s risk, it should also be low enough so that
an individual is willing to insure his risk (or a part of it) for this premium. The economic
models for (re)insurance markets, which were developed from the 1960’s on (cf. Borch
(1962a) and Bühlmann (1980), (1984)), consider indeed the interests of both the insurers
and the insureds. These models incorporate the possibility to study problems concerning
fairness, Pareto optimality and market equilibrium. Bühlmann (1980), for example, shows
that the Esscher calculation principle results in a Pareto optimal outcome. For an overview of
economic models in insurance see Borch (1990).
Game theory is also used to model the interests of all parties in an insurance problem.
Examples can be found in Borch (1962b), Lemaire (1991), Alegre and Mercè Claramunt
(1995), and Suijs et al. (1998). The latter uses stochastic cooperative games to model individual
insurance as well as reinsurance by insurance companies. The results they obtain, however,
only hold for exponentially distributed losses. This paper generalizes Suijs et al. (1998) in the
sense that it allows arbitrary random losses. We determine Pareto optimal allocations and show
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that the zero utility principle for calculating premiums (see Goovaerts et al. (1984)) yields a
core allocation.
2 Stochastic Cooperative games
Let us first recall some of the definitions concerning stochastic cooperative games as introduced
by Suijs, Borm, De Waegenaere and Tijs (1999). A stochastic cooperative game is described
by a tuple   = (N; fXSgSN ; f igi2N), where N is the set of agents, XS the nonempty set
of random payoffs coalition S can obtain, and i the preference relation of agent i over the
set L1(IR) of stochastic payoffs with finite expectation. We assume that for each agent the
preferences are complete, transitive and continuous1. The class of all cooperative games with
stochastic payoffs with agent set N is denoted by SG(N).
An allocation of a stochastic payoff XS 2 XS to coalition S is described by a pair
(d; r) 2 IRS  IRS such that
P
i2S di  0 and
P
i2S ri = 1 and ri  0 for all i 2 S. The payoff
to agent i 2 S according to the allocation (d; r) equals di + riXS . The set of all allocations
for coalition S is denoted by Z (S).
The core of a stochastic cooperative game is defined as follows. Let   2 SG(N)
and (di + riXN )i2N ) 2 Z (N). Then the allocation (di + riXN )i2N is a core allocation for
the game   if for each coalition S there is no allocation ( ~di + ~riXN )i2S 2 Z (S) such that
~di + ~riXS i di + riXS for all i 2 S. The set of all core allocations for   is denoted by C( ).
Next, consider preferences f igi2N such that for each i 2 N there exists a function
mi : L
1(IR)! IR satisfying
(M1) for all X;Y 2 L1(IR) : X iY if and only if mi(X)  mi(Y );
(M2) for all X 2 L1(IR) and all d 2 IR: mi(d+X) = d +mi(X).
The interpretation is thatmi(X) equals the amount of moneym for which agent i is indifferent
between receiving the amount mi(X) with certainty and receiving the stochastic payoff X .
The amount mi(X) is called the certainty equivalent of X . Condition (M1) states that agent
i weakly prefers one stochastic payoff to another one if and only if the certainty equivalent
of the former is greater than or equal to the certainty equivalent of the latter. Condition (M2)
states that the certainty equivalent is linearly separable in the deterministic amount of money
d. The class of all stochastic coopertive games satisfying conditions (M1) and (M2) is denoted
by MG(N).
Example 1 Consider the preferences based on a utility function of the form U(t) = e t,
(t 2 IR), where  < 0 and  > 0. The certainty equivalent of X 2 L1(IR) can be defined by
1The preferences  are continuous if for all X 2 L
1(IR) the sets fY 2 L1(IR)jY Xg and fY 2
L1(IR)jY Xg are closed.
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m(X) = U 1(E(U(X))). It is easy to check that m satisfies condition (M1). For condition




































The following theorem regarding nonemptiness of the core is due to Suijs and Borm
(1999).




mi(d̂i + r̂iX̂)j (d̂i + r̂iX̂)i2S 2 Z (S)
)
;
for all S  N .
3 Insurance Games
For modeling insurance problems we use a slightly modified version of a stochastic cooperative
game as introduced in Suijs et al. (1999). We show that by cooperating, individuals and insurers
can redistribute their risks and, consequently, improve their welfare. First, we need to specify
the agents that participate in the game. An agent can be one of two types, either an individual
person or an insurer. The set of individual persons is denoted by NP and the set of insurers is
denoted by NI . Hence, the agents of the game are denoted by the set NI [ NP .
Again, all agents are assumed to be risk averse expected utility maximizers with utility
function Ui(t) = ie it, (t 2 IR), with i < 0, i > 0 for all i 2 NI [NP . By changing the
signs of the parameters i and i the utility function becomes convex, and, as a consequence,
the agent will be risk loving. Regarding the situations where one or more risk neutral/loving
insurers are involved we confine ourselves to a brief discussion later on.
Next, let Xi withXi 2 L1(IR+) describe the future random losses of agent i 2 NI[NP .
For an individual i 2 NP , the variable  Xi describes the random losses that could occur to
this individual. They include, for example, the monetary damages caused by cars, bikes, fires,
or people. For an insurance company i 2 NI , the variable  Xi describes the random losses
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corresponding to its insurance portfolio. We assume that the random losses Xi , (i 2 NI[NP ),
are mutually independent.
Now, let us focus on the possibilities that occur when agents decide to cooperate.
Therefore, consider a coalition S of agents. If the members of S decide to cooperate, the total
loss XS 2 L1(IR) of coalition S equals the sum of the individual losses of the members of S,
i.e., XS =  
P
i2S Xi. Subsequently, the loss XS has to be allocated to the members of S.
In Suijs et al. (1999) an allocation of the random payoff XS to the members of coalition
S is described by a pair (d; r) satisfying
P
i2S di  0,
P
i2S ri = 1 , and ri  0 fo rall i 2 S.
Given an allocation (d; r), agent i 2 S \ NP receives di + riXS . Applying this definition to
insurance games, however, raises a problem. For XS not only consists of the future random
losses of agent i, but also of the future random losses of all other individuals j 2 S \ NP .
Hence, if agent i receives di + riXS he receives (part of) the random losses of his fellow
agents j 2 S \ NP . Furthermore, this means that an agent j 2 S \ NP transfers (part of) his
random losses to agent i, or, put in other words, agent j insures (part of) his random losses at
agent i. But this is rather unusual; agents only make insurance deals with insurance companies
and not with other individuals. So, we need to modify our definition of an allocation so as
to incorporate transfers of random losses from individuals to insurance companies only. The
option we choose for is to replace the vector r 2 S by a matrix R 2 IRSS . An element
rij then represents the fraction of agent j’s random loss that he transfers to agent i. Then by
imposing the right conditions on R we can guarantee that individuals cannot transfer any risks
among each other.
For explaining an allocation of the loss XS in more detail, we distinguish between the
following three cases. In the first case, coalition S consists of insurers only. So, S  NI .
Such a coalition is assumed to allocate the loss XS in the following way. First, a coalition
S allocates a fraction rij 2 [0; 1] of the loss Xj of insurer j 2 S to insurer i 2 S. So,
insurer i bears a total loss of
P
j2S rijXj , where rij 2 [0; 1] and
P
k2S rkj = 1. This is called
proportional (re)insurance. This part of the allocation of XS for coalition S is described by
a matrix R 2 IRSS+ , where rij represents the fraction insurer i bears of insurer j’s loss Xj .
Second, the insurers are allowed to make deterministic transfer payments. This means that
each insurance company i 2 S also receives an amount di 2 IR such that
P
j2S dj  0. These
transfer payments can be interpreted as the aggregate premium insurers have to pay for the
actual risk exchanges.
In the second case, coalition S consists of individual persons only. So, S  NP . Then
the gains of cooperation are assumed to be nil. That is, we do not allow any risk exchanges
between the persons themselves. For, that is what the insurers are for in the first place. As a
result, the only allocations (d;R) of XS which are allowed are of the form rii = 1 for all i 2 S
and rij = 0 for all i; j 2 S with i 6= j.
In the third and last case, coalition S consists of both insurers and individual persons.
So, S  NI [ NP . Now cooperation can take place in two different ways. First, insurers
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are allowed to exchange (parts of) their portfolios with other insurers, and, second, individual
persons may transfer (parts of) their risks to insurers. Again, individual persons are not allowed
to exchange risks with each other. Moreover, we assume that insurers cannot transfer (parts
of) their portfolios to individuals.
Summarizing we can say that there are several restrictions on allocations. To be more
precise, denote by SI the set of insurers of coalition S, i.e., SI = S \ NI , and by SP the set
of individuals of coalition S, i.e., SP = S \ NP . Then an allocation (d;R) 2 IR
S  IRSS+ is
feasible for the coalition S if for all i 2 SP and all j 2 S with i 6= j it holds that rij = 0 andP
i2S rij = 1 for all j 2 S. Furthermore, given an allocation (d;R) of the random loss XS ,
agent i 2 S receives di +
P
j2S rijXj = di +RiX
S , where Ri denotes the i-th row of R and
XS = ( Xi)i2S .
Example 1 Let NI = f1; 2g, NP = f3; 4g and consider the coalition S = f1; 3; 4g. Then
XS =  X1  X3  X4. A feasible allocation for S is the following. Let d = (3; 2; 1) and
r11 = 1, r13 =
1
2 , r33 =
1
2 , r14 =
1
5 and r44 =
4
5 . Then insurer 1 receives
d1 +R1X















So, individuals 3 and 4 pay a premium of 2 and 1, respectively, to insurer 1 for the insurance
of their losses.
In conclusion, an insurance game   with agent set NI [ NP is described by the tuple
(NI [NP ; fXSgSN ; fUigi2NI[NP ), where NI is the set of insurers, NP the set of individuals,
XS = f
P
i2S  Xig the random loss for coalition S, and Ui the utility function for agent
i 2 NI [ NP . The class of all such insurance games with insurers NI and individuals NP is
denoted by IG(NI ; NP ).
3.1 Pareto Optimal Distributions of Risk
Since the preferences of each agent are described by means of an exponential utility function,
we can confine ourselves to considering certainty equivalents. In this model, we define the
certainty equivalent by mi(X) = U
 1
i (E(Ui(X))) provided that the expected utility exists,
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of course.2 From Example 1 it follows that the certainty equivalent for exponential utility
functions satisfies the conditions (M1) and (M2). Hence, the results stated in Suijs and Borm
(1999) on certainty equivalents apply. One of these results concerns the Pareto optimality of
an allocation. For insurance games this result reads as follows.
Proposition 2 Let  2 IG(NI ; NP ) andS  NI[NP . An allocation (di+RiXS)i2S 2 Z (S)








mi( ~di + ~RiX





So, an allocation is Pareto optimal for coalition S if and only if this allocation maximizes
the sum of the certainty equivalents. To determine these allocations, we first need to calculate
the certainty equivalent of an allocation (di +RiXS)i2S 2 Z (S) for agent i 2 S. Therefore,
let S  NI [ NP and (di + RiXS)i2S 2 Z (S). The random loss coalition S has to allocate
equals XS =
P
i2S Xi. Given a feasible allocation (di + RiX
S)i2S 2 Z (S), the random
payoff to agent i 2 S equals
di +RiX




if i 2 SI and
di +RiX
S = di   riiXi
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2Throughout this paper we assume that the utility functions and random payoffs are such that the expected




i2S di = 0 for Pareto optimal allocations, we have for these allocations that the
sum of the certainty equivalents is independent of the vector of transfer payments d. Intuitively,
this is quite clear. For since
P
h2S dh  0, an increase in di for agent i implies that dj decreases
for at least one other agent j. Consequently, Pareto optimality is solely determined by the
choice of the allocation risk exchange matrix R of the random losses. In fact, the next theorem
shows that there is a unique allocation risk exchange matrix R inducing Pareto optimality.
Theorem 3 Let   2 IG(NI ; NP ) and S  NI [NP . An allocation (di +RiX
S)i2S 2 Z (S)















, if i 2 SI [ fjg and j 2 SP ;
0 , otherwise:
























rij = 1; for all j 2 SP ;P
i2SI
rij = 1; for all j 2 SI ;
rii  0; if i 2 SP ;
rij  0; if i 2 SI and j 2 S:
Lemma 1 with c = i and x = rij for all relevant combinations of i; j 2 S, implies that the
objective function is strictly concave. Hence, it is sufficient to prove that R is a solution of
this maximization problem. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions3 tell us that this is indeed
3 The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions read as follows:
If f(x) = maxy f(y)
s.t. gk(y)  0; k 2 K
gl(y) = 0; l 2 L
then there exist k  0 (8k 2 K) and l 2 IR (8l 2 L) such that
rf(x) =
P
k2K k  rgk(x) +
P
l2L l  rgl(x)
k  gk(x) = 0, for all k 2 K:
Moreover, if f is strictly concave and gk (k 2 K), gl (l 2 L) are convex then the reverse of the statement also
holds and the maximum is unique.
8






























= j   ij ; for all i 2 SI and all j 2 S;
jjrjj = 0; for all j 2 SP ;
ijrij = 0; for all i 2 SI and all j 2 S:





















. Consequently, R is the optimal solution. 2
So, for a Pareto optimal allocation of a loss Xj within S one has to distinguish between
two cases. In the first case the index j refers to an insurer and in the second case j refers to
an individual. When Xj is the loss of insurer j 2 SI , the loss is allocated proportionally to
1
i
among all insurers in coalition S. WhenXj is the loss of individual j 2 SP , the loss is allocated
proportionally to 1i among all insurers in coalition S and individual j himself. Note that by
the feasibility constraints nothing is allocated to the other individuals. Furthermore, remark
that if only reinsurance of the insurance portfolios is considered, that is, NP = ; then the
Pareto optimal allocation coincides with the Pareto optimal allocation of (re)insurance markets
discussed in Bühlmann (1980).
The determination of the allocation risk exchange matrix is, of course, only one part
of the allocation. We still have to determine the vector of transfer payments d, that is, the
premiums that have to be paid. Although an allocation (di+RiX
S)i2S may be Pareto optimal
for any choice of d, not every d is satisfactory from a social point of view. An insurer will
not agree with insuring the losses of other agents if he is not properly compensated, that is,
if he does not receive a fair premium for the insurance. Similarly, insurance companies and
individuals only agree to insure their losses if the premium they have to pay is reasonable.
Consequently, there is a conflict of interests; both insurance companies and individuals want
to pay a low premium for insuring their own losses, while insurance companies want to receive
a high premium for bearing the losses of other agents.
3.2 The Zero Utility Premium Calculation Principle
Premium calculation principles indicate how to determine the premium for a certain risk. In
the past, various of these principles were designed, for example, the net premium principle,
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the expected value principle, the standard deviation principle, the Esscher principle, and the
zero utility principle (cf. Goovaerts et al. (1984). In this section we focus on the zero utility
principle. A premium calculation principle determines a premium i(X) for individual i for
bearing the risk X . The zero utility principle assigns a premium i(X) to X such that the
utility level of individual i, who bears the risk X , remains unchanged when the wealth wi of
this individual changes to wi + i(X) X . Since individuals are expected utility maximizers
this means that the premium i(X) satisfies Ui(wi) = E(Ui(wi + i(X) X)). Note that the
premium of the risk X depends on the individual who bears this risk and his wealth wi.
Now, let us return to insurance games and utilize the zero utility principle to determine
the allocation transfer payments d 2 IRNI[NP . At first this might seem difficult since the zero
utility principle requires initial wealthswi which do not appear in our model of insurance games.
The exponential utility functions, however, yield that the zero utility principle is independent
of these initial wealths wi. To see this, let   2 IG(NI ; NP ) be an insurance game. Since utility




i (E(Ui(wi + i(X) X))) = wi + i(X) + U
 1
i (E(Ui( X))):
Hence, i(X) =  U 1i (E(Ui( X))) =  mi( X) which indeed is independent of the wealth
wi. Furthermore, we can calculate the premium that agents receive for the risk they bear. For















, if i 2 SI [ fjg and j 2 SP ;
0 , otherwise:
Since the risk that insurer i bears equals
P
j2NI[NP
rijXj , the premium he should receive for








Note that due to the mutual independence of (Xi)i2NI[NP , the zero utility principle satisfies








ijXj). As a consequence, we let the
premium that individual i 2 NP has to pay for insuring his loss at insurer j equal the zero
utility premium that this insurer wants to receive for bearing this risk. Hence, individual i
pays insurer j an amount j(rjiXi) =  mj( r

jiXi). Because individuals are not allowed to







Similarly, the premium that insurer i has to pay for reinsuring the fraction rji of his own
portfolio Xi at insurer j, equals the premium that insurer j wants to receive for bearing this
risk, that is, j(rjiXi) =  mj( r
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for all i 2 NP .
Theorem 4 Let   2 IG(NI ; NP ). If d0 is the vector of transfer payments determined by the




N )i2N 2 C( ).
PROOF: By Theorem 2 it suffices to show that (mi(d0i   R

iX





























































































































where the second equality follows from Theorem 3.

































































































































where the inequality follows from Lemma 2 with c = 1 and x = 1
(S)
. 2
Example 5 In this example all monetary amounts are stated in thousands of dollars. Consider
the following situation in automobile insurance with two insurance companies and three indi-
vidual persons. So, NI = f1; 2g and NP = f3; 4; 5g. The utility function of each agent can be
described by Ui(t) = e it with 1 = 0:1, 2 = 0:167, 3 = 0:333, 4 = 0:125 and 5 = 0:2,
respectively. For evaluating random payoffs X 2 L1(IR), we focus on the corresponding
certainty equivalent mi(X) = U
 1
i (E(Ui(X))), i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g.
Each insurance company bears the risk of all the cars contained in its insurance portfolio.
A car can be either one of two types. The first type corresponds to an average saloon car with
a retail price of $20, and generates relatively low losses. The second type corresponds to an
exclusive sportscar with a retail price of $200, and generates relatively high losses. More
precisely, the monetary loss generated by a car is uniformly distributed between zero and its
retail price. Thus the expected loss of a type 1 car and a type 2 car equal $ 10 and $ 100,
respectively.
The insurance portfolio of insurer 1 consists of 900 cars of type 1 and 25 cars of type 2.
For insurer 2 the portfolio consists of 400 cars of type 1 and 70 cars of type 2. The expected
loss for insurer 1 then equals 900  10 + 25  100 = $ 11500. The expected losses for insurer 2
equals $ 11000. The individuals 3 and 4 each possess one car. Individual 3’s car is of type 1
and individual 4’s car is of type 2. Individual 5 possesses both cars. The expected losses are
$ 10, $ 100, and $ 110, respectively.
Next, let Xi denote the loss of agent i. If all agents cooperate, the Pareto optimal risk
13




































Then the certainty equivalent of a Pareto optimal allocation (di+RiX




















N ) = d5   39:
The insurance premiums that the agents have to pay, are calculated according to the zero




















































 9739 + 6 + 62 + 78   5597 = 4288:
Similarly, we get for insurer 2 and individuals 3, 4 and 5
d02 = 5597 + 3 + 37 + 47   9739 =  4055;
d03 =  3   6 =  9;
d04 =  37   62 =  99;
d05 =  47   78 =  125:
With d0 = (4288; 4055; 9; 99; 125) being the aggregate insurance premiums we obtain
that (mi(d0i + R

iX
N ))i2N = ( 14294; 15204; 11; 149; 164). It is a straightforward
exercise to check that ( 14294; 15204; 11; 149; 164) is a core allocation of the corre-
sponding TU-game (N; v ) presented in Table 1.




N )i2N is realized. In the initial situation insurer 1 bears the risk X1 of his own
insurance portfolio. The certainty equivalent of X1 equals










S v (S) S v (S) S v (S)
f1g  14704 f2; 5g  17730 f2; 3; 4g  17725
f2g  17551 f3; 4g  189 f2; 3; 5g  17742
f3g  14 f3; 5g  209 f2; 4; 5g  17893
f4g  174 f4; 5g  369 f3; 4; 5g  383
f5g  195 f1; 2; 3g  29509 f1; 2; 3; 4g  29658
f1; 2g  29498 f1; 2; 4g  29647 f1; 2; 3; 5g  29672
f1; 3g  14715 f1; 2; 5g  29661 f1; 2; 4; 5g  29810
f1; 4g  14861 f1; 3; 4g  14872 f1; 3; 4; 5g  15044
f1; 5g  14876 f1; 3; 5g  14888 f2; 3; 4; 5g  17905
f2; 3g  17562 f1; 4; 5g  15053 f1; 2; 3; 4;5g  29822
f2; 4g  17713
Table 1:
To allocate the total risk in a Pareto optimal way, insurer 1 bears the fraction r12 =
10
16 of the risk
X2 of insurer 2. For this risk he receives a premium 1(
10
16X2) as determined by the zero utility
principle. From the definition of the zero utility calculation principle and the independence of




16X2))   14704. So insurer 1’s welfare
does not change when he insures a part of the risk of insurer 2. A similar argument holds when











































N )   14294 >  14704:
The phenomenon described above is subsistent in the definition of the zero utility
principle. This means that the welfare of an insurer always remains the same when he bears
the risk of someone else in exchange for the zero utility principle based premium. An increase
in welfare only arises when he transfers (a part of) his own risk to someone else.
4 Subadditivity for Collective Insurances
In the insurance games defined in the previous section individual persons are not allowed to
cooperate; they cannot redistribute the risk amongst themselves. Looking at the individuals’
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behavior in everyday life, this is a justified assumption. People who want to insure themselves
against certain risks do so by contacting insurance companies, pension funds etc. We show,
however, that when this restriction is abandoned then the mere fact that risk exchanges could
take place between individuals implies that insurance companies have incentives to employ
subadditive premiums. Whether or not such risk exchanges actually do take place is not
important. As a consequence, collective insurances become cheaper for the individuals.
LetNP be the set of individuals. A premium calculation principle  is called subadditive
if for all subsets S; T  NP with S \ T = ; it holds that (XS) + (XT )  (XS + XT ).
Here, XS denotes the total loss of the coalition S. So, it is attractive for the individuals to take
a collective insurance, since this reduces the total premium they have to pay.
Next, consider a game with agent set NP only where the individuals are allowed to
redistribute their risks. This situation can be described by an insurance game   2 IG(NP ; ;).
So, the individuals NP can now insure their losses among each other. Then we can associate








for all S  NP . Note that this maximum is attained for Pareto optimal allocations (di  
RiX
S)i2S 2 Z (S) for coalition S. For this game, the value v (S) can be interpreted
as the maximum premium coalition S wants to pay for the insurance of the total risk XS .
To see this, suppose that the coalition S can insure the loss XS for a premium (XS) that
exceeds the valuation of the risk XS , that is,  (XS) < v (S). Then for each allocation
y 2 IRS of the premium  (XS) there exists an allocation ( ~di   RiX




S)) > Ui(yi) for all i 2 S. Indeed, let (di  RiX




S) = v (S). Define
~di = di  mi(di  R

iX
S) + yi +
1
#S (v (S) + (XS)) ;












yi + v (S) + (XS)
=
P
i2S di  0
it follows that ( ~di  RiXS)i2S 2 Z (S). Then by the linearity of mi in ~di (cf. expression (2))




S) = yi +
1
#S (v (S) + (XS)) > yi:
Hence, the members of S prefer the allocation ( ~di RiX
S)i2S ofXS to an insurance ofXS and
paying the premium (XS). Consequently, they will not pay more for the insurance of the risk
XS than the amount v (S). Now, it is a straightforward exercise to show that this maximum
premium  v (S) satisfies subadditivity, i.e.  v (S)   v (T )   v (S [ T ). For totally
balancedness of insurance games implies superadditivity, i.e. v (S) + v (T )  v (S [ T ) for
all disjoint S; T  N .
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5 Remarks
In this paper (re)insurance problems are modelled as cooperative games with stochastic payoffs.
In fact, we defined a game that dealt with both the insurance and the reinsurance problem
simultaneously. We showed that there is only one allocation risk exchange matrix yielding
a Pareto optimal distribution of the losses and that a core allocation results when insurance
premiums are calculated according to the zero utility principle.
Recall that insurers do not benefit from insuring the risks of the individuals when utilizing
the additive zero utility principle; this premium calculation principle yields the lowest premium
for which insurers still want to exchange risks with the individuals (see Example 5). So, from
a social point of view, it might be best to adopt a middle course and look for premiums where
both insurers and individuals benefit from the insurance transaction. Interesting questions then
remaining are: are these premiums additive or subadditive and do they yield core allocations?
An issue only briefly mentioned in this paper concerns the insurers’ behavior. What if
an insurer is risk neutral or risk loving instead of risk averse? Thus, there is at least one insurer
whose utility function is linear or of the form ui(t) = ie it (t 2 IR) with i > 0, i < 0.
Although the proofs are not provided here, most of the results presented in this paper still hold
for these situations. This means that the corresponding games have nonempty cores and that
the zero utility principle still yields a core allocation. The result that does change is the Pareto
optimal allocation of the risk. The allocations that are Pareto optimal when all insurers are risk
averse are not Pareto optimal anymore when one or more insurers happen to be risk loving. In
fact, they are the worst possible allocations of the risk one can think of. In that case, allocating
all the risk to the most risk loving insurer is Pareto optimal. This would actually mean that only
one insurance company is needed, since other insurance companies will ultimately reinsure
their complete portfolios at this most risk loving insurer.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the results presented in this paper still go through
if we replace the assumption that the risks (Xi)i2NP[Ni are mutually independent by the
assumption that the covariance matrix of (Xi)i2NP[Ni is negative definite.
6 Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1 Let c 2 IRnf0g and let F be a probability distribution function corresponding to a



















































Hence, hc is concave. The lemma then follows from the observation that the inequality is
binding if and only if F corresponds to a degenerate random variable. 2

































































































































































Thus, since (7) is a decreasing function in x taking the value zero in x = 0, it follows that (7)
is negative for all x > 0. 2
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